The shot that shook the nation: Revisiting the 1966 Nigerian coup d'état

‘In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian armed forces, I declare martial law over the northern provinces of Nigeria.’ Those were the words that opened the speech of Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu in which he announced the 15 January 1966 coup. Since that day, a lot has been said and written about Nigeria’s first military coup, yet—despite the plethora of information, including written works by some of the participants in the coup—the truth about the coup remains hard to accept, if not access. In retrospect, this is understandable: the coup was totally unexpected despite the situation in Nigeria at the time and its impacts were far-reaching, way beyond what its plotters anticipated—and fifty-six years after the event, it has been difficult for Nigerians to find closure.

So who were the brains behind the coup? The word “brains” here is relative. There were those who conceived the plot, those who planned and organized the coup, including recruiting other plotters, and there were those who were not in the inner circle but were involved. Leaked snippets of the report of the Special Branch of the Nigerian Police on the coup claim that Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Major Donatus Okafor and Captain Ogbo Oji were the original members of the inner circle of the January plotters and that they began to plan the coup as far back as August 1965 to address the problems bedevilling Nigeria. However, there is evidence that the plans for a coup among the officers who struck on Saturday, January 15, 1966, started before 1965.

First, Major Adewale Ademoyega in his book, “Why We Struck”, talks about building a great friendship with Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna—who were already in the army—in 1961 when he enlisted into the army. The three politically conscious young men believed in a military revolution to “shake up” the new Nigerian state, which many radicals and left-wing intellectuals still saw as an outpost of British neocolonialism. Over the years that followed, the trio’s aspirations solidified into a plot, and as politicians’ misgovernance worsened, the officers got more recruits into their fold.

Other accounts report that the political crisis that engulfed Nigeria, following the massively rigged 1964 general elections, persuaded some of these 1966 plotters (and even others who did not participate in the coup) to contemplate military intervention. Major Ifeajuna and Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Banjo, who did not participate in the January coup but gave it his blessings, were suspected—by Nigerian security agencies—of planning a military intervention to break the lock jam occasioned by the awful election. During the January coup, Major Nzeogwu told an army officer, Major Alexander Madiebo, that he had planned an operation to neutralize top military leaders who would be present at the 1964 army shooting competition by sedating them. It failed because the brass, probably suspicious in the tense situation or just being security conscious, did not attend the event.

Be that as it may, the inner circle, troubled by the events in the country, set about recruiting officers. Given the sensitive nature of a coup and the implications of discovery or failure for plotters, the January Boys, as they are colloquially known, were circumspect. Nzeogwu was however known to tell young officers at the Nigerian Military Training College, Kaduna, where he was the chief instructor, “Wait until the day you will look at the senior officers through the sights of your rifle.” One officer was sufficiently concerned to report Nzeogwu to their superiors, namely Colonel Ralph Shodeinde and Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun. Shodeinde who did not take action against his direct subordinate, nevertheless noted that “there is never smoke without fire, even if it is smouldering fire.” In response to Shodeinde’s assessment, the commander of the first brigade of the army based in Kaduna, Brigadier Ademulegun, wrote that Nzeogwu was a young man in a hurry who should be closely watched. Both men paid for their lax approach to the complaint with their lives in the early hours of 15 January.

Contrary to the myth that five majors plotted the coup, the actual number of plotters were more. Below is a list of the main participants in the coup:

MAJORS

Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu

Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna

Adewale Ademoyega

Donatus Okafor

Humphrey Iwuchukwu Chukwuka

Timothy Onwuatuegwu

Christian Anufuro

John Obienu (failed to show up on the day of the coup, joining instead the officers who crushed the coup.)

CAPTAINS

Ben Gbulie

Emma Nwobosi

Ogbonna Oji

Ganiyu Adeleke

Emmanuel Udeaja

LIEUTENANTS

Amechi Okaka

Edwin Okafor

Fola Oyewole

Olafimihan

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Cyril Azubuogu

Harris Eghagha

Godfrey Ezedigbo

Ozoemena Igweze

Patrick Ibik

Bob Ikejiofor

John Atom Kpera

Emmanuel Nweke

Samson Emeka Omeruah

Dag Waribor

The plotters planned to strike at the Federal Capital, Lagos, and all the four regional capitals of Nigeria, namely, Kaduna, Ibadan, Enugu and Benin. Nzeogwu was the regional commander of the coup in northern Nigeria, with Onwuatuegwu as a co-commander. Ben Gbulie was one of the officers who participated in the coup under their command. The commander in Lagos was Ifeajuna, and co-commanders were Anuforo, Chukwuka, Ademoyega, and Okafor. Ifeajuna also had oversight of the Western region, but the actual execution of the coup there was overseen by Captain Nwobosi.

Although the leaked Special Branch report—which this author has read—and certain writers who want to justify the argument that the coup was an Igbo plot claim there was no coup attempt in the eastern /mid-western regions, governed by Igbo politicians, information from Ademoyega show the contrary. In his book, Ademoyega alluded to the difficulties the plotters had in recruiting officers. Major Chude-Sokei was one of their successes and was put in charge of the East. But before the coup, he was sent abroad for a course. Ifeajuna and company replaced him with one Lieutenant Oguchi, who was on a course in Lagos. His vehicle broke down on his way to the East from Lagos—he only got to the East in the early hours of the 15th.

In Max Silloun’s book, “Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture” (page 54), he wrote:

“Contrary to popular myth, a coup was attempted in Enugu (East) and Benin (Mid-west). Overnight Major Ifeajuna sent orders to the first battalion in Enugu asking them to deploy soldiers to take over key installations and arrest government ministers in Enugu and Benin. As there was no military formation in the Mid west, no soldiers could be deployed directly from the region. For several hours the officers mulled over the strange but seemingly legitimate order (my explanation: operationally, the first battalion was under the command of the Lagos-based second brigade commanded by Brigadier Maimalari. Ifeajuna was the brigade major and could pass off instructions in that capacity, but they must be approved by Maimalari, a no-nonsense officer who trusted his brigade major. Alas, he was not aware of the illegality Ifeajuna was perpetrating in his official capacity). Finally, they took position at the Enugu airport in the early hours of the morning. A different company of soldiers under Captain Joseph Ihedigbo also headed to the Mid west region’s capital of Benin. The Igbo premier of the region Dennis Osadebey subsequently speculated that the life of the Eastern region’s premier, Dr. Michael Okpara, was spared because the head of state of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, was his guest at the time of the coup. A more plausible reason for Okpara’s survival is that the officer assigned to arrest him (Lieutenant Oguchi) was one of those who advocated a bloodless coup. As soon as Makarios departed to return to Cyprus, Okpara was arrested.”

In the north, the coup took place under the cover of a three-day night-time training exercise called Exercise Damisa (Hausa for Leopard). As Chief Instructor of the Nigerian Military Training College, Nzeogwu could organize such exercises without arousing any suspicion. On the final night of the exercise—midnight, 14 January—he told the officers the real purpose of the exercise. The group, made up of military personnel from all parts of Nigeria, welcomed the idea of a coup to unseat the unpopular government. Of the gathering, Nzeogwu said, in an interview with the defunct Kaduna-based “New Nigerian” newspaper of 18 January 1966,

“On Saturday morning the other officers and men thought they were going out only on a night exercise. It was not until they were out in the bush that they were told the full details of the plan. . . . Any man had the chance to drop out. More than that, they had bullets. They had been issued with bullets but I was unarmed. If they had disagreed they could have shot me. . . . Most of the other ranks were northerners but they followed. . . . It was a truly Nigerian gathering. Only in the army do you get true Nigerianism.”

Nzeogwu and his officers either killed or were responsible for the deaths of the following political and military leaders in Kaduna, the capital of the Northern region and centre of many strategic military locations:

Ahmadu Bello – the premier of the North

Hafsatu Bello – the wife of the premier

Brigadier Ademulegun – commander of the first brigade

Colonel Ralph Shodeinde – Nigerian Military Training College commandant

Latifat Ademulegun — the Brigadier’s wife

Zarunmi Sardauna – Ahmadu Bello’s bodyguard

Ahmed Ben Musa – the premier’s senior assistant secretary for security.

Ahmed Pategi – a government driver

Also, one of the soldiers who attacked Bello’s house with Nzeogwu was killed. There is an account that Nzeogwu shot him for refusing to fire the anti-tank weapon used on the premier’s house. Some of the policemen on guard duty at the premier’s house were reportedly shot by the intruders. Nzeogwu himself was wounded in the attack.

“Given the sensitive nature of a coup and the implications of discovery or failure for plotters, the January Boys, as they are colloquially known, were circumspect”

In Lagos, Ifeajuna hosted the plotters, shortly after playing right-hand man to Brigadier Maimalari at a lavish party the latter had hosted to celebrate his new marriage. Ifeajuna, in his capacity as the commander of the coup in Lagos, then Nigeria’s capital, sent the signal to other operators outside Lagos to strike. He code-named the coup in Lagos, “Operation New Wash”. Brigadier Maimalari’s party was a first-class reception attended by bigwigs in Lagos, including many of the plotters and other military officers who had attended a brigade military conference. The party was a befitting conclusion to the conference, and Ifeajuna played a significant role in organizing it as the brigade major. At the meeting of the plotters in Ifeajuna’s house after the party, Captain Adeleke initially had reservations and wanted to leave but was persuaded to stay. I doubt if he would have survived the night if he had refused to participate. Ifeajuna and his colleagues used the cover of mobilizing for internal security operations to mobilize men, vehicles, and weapons for their coup. This was possible because the military was involved in checking the instability in the Western region following the 1965 elections.

The rendezvous for the plotters, including the Western region operatives, was to be the Federal Guards Unit, commanded by Major Okafor. This unit provided security for the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa. Ademoyega had the assignment of broadcasting at the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, Lagos, announcing the military takeover. Ifeajuna was responsible for the arrest of the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa. His death came later. To date, there is still some controversy as to whether Ifeajuna shot him. The Special Branch report claims that Ifeajuna carried out the killing. But in the September 30 2010 edition of The Nation newspaper, late Dr Matthew Mbu, a minister in Balewa’s government, claimed that Balewa died from adverse health issues. The minister’s source of information was the great Igbo poet, Christopher Okigbo. Okigbo was well known as a close friend of Major Ifeajuna. The same Ifeajuna, assisted by Ezedigbo, shot Lieutenant-Colonel Abogo Largema. Ezedigbo and his team also arrested the finance minister, Chief Okotie-Eboh.

Anuforo, according to the Special Branch report, shot Colonel Kur Mohammed and Lieutenant-Colonels Pam and Unegbe, the only Igbo officer killed by the plotters. He, supported by Ademoyega, also killed Okotie-Eboh. Pam was arrested by Major Chukwuka, his friend and second-in-command. He assured his family no harm would come to Pam, but Anuforo, who outranked Chukwuka and apparently nursed bitterness towards Pam for the way he commanded the 1964 operations to rein in the restive Tiv in northern Nigeria, brushed aside Chukwuka’s objections and shot Pam. Okafor bungled his tasks of arresting the GOC, Major-General Ironsi and Brigadier Maimalari. Ironsi was not home when the plotters came and his security detail stood firm, denying Okafor access. Maimalari escaped, only to run into Ifeajuna’s group. Unaware his brigade major was in on the plot, he flagged down Ifeajuna’s car and was promptly gunned down by his “rescuer”. Ademoyega successfully carried out his task of seizing major installations in Lagos, including the Broadcasting Corporation and telephone exchange. All he had to do was make the broadcast when his colleagues had finished their tasks and linked up with their co-plotters in other regional capitals.

Ironsi’s escape was however the beginning of the coup’s failure. There are speculations that his escape was not totally due to his ability. Olusegun Obasanjo wrote in his book “Nzeogwu” that Ogbo Oji, one of the plotters, held back his finger on the trigger after meeting the escaping general on Carter Bridge. Both men come from the Umuahia axis of Igboland, and fraternal ties might have stayed Oji’s hand. However, writing on the same escape, Fredrick Forsyth in his book “The Biafra Story” wrote that Ironsi practically browbeat Oji’s men at the roadblocks they set up by intimidating them into letting him go. In my opinion, Oji’s men were probably shocked to see the general still alive. Colonel Pam or his wife got a call across to the general before Pam was whisked off. And Ironsi’s guard commander would have filled him in when he returned—Ironsi had gone to a boat party at Apapa after Maimalari’s reception. One cannot also rule out the strong possibility that Major Obienu tipped him off. Obienu did not attend the meeting at Ifeajuna’s house though he was at Maimalari’s party. Being the commander of the second reconnaissance armoured squadron, his armoured vehicles were indispensable to the plotters. But he never showed up. There are some who think that General Ironsi was part of the coup. What weakens this argument is Nzeogwu’s assertion, after the coup, that the general’s death was a part of the plot.

Ironsi began countermeasures against the coup. As the army GOC (General Officer Commanding), he could get all army officers to obey his orders and had unfettered access to all army installations. He could also link up with the police, sister services, and government agencies, as well as seek the help of foreign militaries, though with government approval.

Meanwhile, Nwobosi and his team took charge of the western region, arresting the deputy premier, Remi Fani-Kayode, and killing his boss, Premier Samuel Akintola, in a shoot-out. They set off for the Federal Guards Unit, Lagos, with the arrested Fani-Kayode and drove into the arms of Ironsi’s men who had now taken over the place.

Backed by many military and police officers, Ironsi put down the coup in Lagos. All the plotters, except Anuforo and Ademoyega, sought safety in flight. Ifeajuna and Okafor’s apparent joint escape gave a strong element of treachery and double-dealing within the ranks of the plotters. Ademoyega wrote in his book that Ifeajuna, Okafor, and Chukwuka failed to show up at their prearranged rendezvous. Also, Ifeajuna insisted on Okafor having the task of arresting Ironsi, even though Ademoyega was sceptical of his competence. Ademoyega had volunteered to take on the task, but since Ifeajuna was his military superior, his word was final. Anuforo and Ademoyega, having failed to hold on to Lagos, headed to Abeokuta to see if they could get Obienu to join them with his much-needed ferrets. Although Obienu was not present, Anuforo used his position as the squadron’s former commander to mobilize the ferrets. On their way back to Lagos, they stopped to refuel and heard a radio broadcast about the failed mutiny by a dissident section of the Nigerian armed forces. Ironsi had successfully regained control of the broadcasting corporation’s Lagos facilities, hitherto under the control of Ademoyega’s men. The officers commanding the ferrets abandoned the plotters; one even pulled a gun on Anuforo when he came after them. Anuforo and Ademoyega set off for Kaduna by train.

Nzeogwu succeeded in the north, but he got no situation report from Lagos. To make matters worse, no broadcast came, except the announcement about dissident soldiers carrying out a mutiny. So Nzeogwu went on air with his infamous broadcast. Two power centres now existed in Nigeria: the north under Nzeogwu and the south under Ironsi. War seemed imminent as Nzeogwu was bent on finishing the coup. What was left of the civilian government handed over to Ironsi. Whether willingly or unwillingly remains a matter of debate to date. It took a written agreement between Nzeogwu and Ironsi, whose position was by no means secure, and the personal intervention of his emissary, Lt. Col. Conrad Nwawo, for Nzeogwu to agree to go to Lagos. Nwawo was Nzeogwu’s former teacher, and the coup plotter had a lot of respect for him. The written agreement stipulated that Nzeogwu and his colleagues would not be tried for their coup, that those of them already detained would be freed, that the people they overthrew will not be returned to power, and the families of military personnel killed in the coup would be compensated. Nzeogwu was a realist: he knew that a military confrontation with Ironsi would most likely not be in his favour. Also, some of the officers with him in Kaduna were moles for Ironsi and systematically eroded his gains, even as they pretended to support his coup. Evidence shows that Nzeogwu was not really interested in war, only political change. He said this in a March 1967 interview with a journalist, Mr Ejindu. Nzeogwu handed over the governorship of the North to Major Hassan Usman Katsina, son of the Emir of Katsina, and flew to Lagos where Ironsi’s men arrested him at the airport and bundled him to detention. The manhunt for free plotters was a success. Virtually all the principal plotters were arrested, including Ifeajuna who had fled across the border under disguise and ended up in Ghana where he was welcomed by President Kwame Nkrumah, a formidable ideological foe of Balewa. The military who overthrew Nkrumah extradited Ifeajuna to Nigeria in March 1966.

WHY DID THE PLOTTERS OF JANUARY 15 1966 STRIKE?

To understand the motives for the coup, perhaps the best thing is to read Nzeogwu’s coup speech. However, it is useful to keep in mind that understanding the reasons why a group of people take up arms against their country’s government is always a complex thing. The reasons for the coup may be summarized thus:

The plotters were determined to end the instability and bloodshed generated by the crises that followed the massively rigged 1965 regional elections in the Western region and the general elections of 1964.
The plotters saw the current government as incompetent, clueless, and increasingly authoritarian. In this regard, they were not alone. Since 1962, crisis after crisis had rocked the country, and the government had badly mismanaged them. These crises included the western region parliament crisis of 1962, the census controversy of 1963, the general strike of 1964, and the Tiv uprising of 1964.
The plotters were angry over the use of the military to quell restiveness among segments of the population opposed to the government. Many of the plotters served in these operations and blamed the politicians for the crisis and wrong use of the army.
Massive corruption and venality among the ruling class also infuriated the plotters.
The plotters (and quite a few other military officers) were angry over the politicization of the military and diluting of standards by the ruling class, in a bid to reduce the stronghold of the south on the army. The colonial era had seen southerners, especially the Igbo, flooding the army, especially the officer corps, as the British laid emphasis on qualifications. Sadly, most of the north was educationally disadvantaged, and thus most northerners who joined the army ended up in the fighting infantry while southerners were placed in the technical services and made it to officer grade. The northern-dominated government sought to change things after independence, and this created disequilibrium.
Many of the plotters were well-educated men who wanted to implant left-wing ideology in Nigeria, then the vogue in many parts of Africa and Latin America.
Interestingly, the plotters claimed they had no desire to take over the government. Nzeogwu, the coup’s spokesman, said, “neither myself nor any of the other lads were in the least interested in governing the country. We were soldiers and not politicians. We had earmarked from the list known to every soldier in this operation who would be what. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was, for example, to be released from jail immediately and to be made the executive provisional president of Nigeria. We were going to make civilians of proven honesty and efficiency who would be thoroughly handpicked to do all the governing.”

One can read books by Ademoyega, and Captains Ben Gbulie and Emma Nwobosi, to see how much the plotters respected Awolowo and the plans they had for him in their coup. Ironically, many of the plotters were Igbo, and Awo was Yoruba. Awolowo, one of the leading lights of Nigeria’s independence movement, was in jail at the time of the coup for allegedly leading a 1962 plot to unseat the Balewa government by force of arms. He was the official opposition leader, and in that capacity, took the government to task with scathing and erudite criticisms. His socialist left-wing rhetoric was in line with the plotters’ mindset; they bought into many of his solutions to Nigeria’s problems. Major Nzegwu of the Air Force and Captain Udeaja’s mandate in the coup was to fly to Calabar on the eve of the coup and free Awolowo from prison. They could not achieve this before Ironsi countered the coup.

Nobody should conclude that the coup had Awolowo’s blessing or support. Evidence shows that the plotters acted independently. Ifeajuna wrote that if Awolowo refused to cooperate with the plotters he would be locked up in the statehouse and decrees issued in his name. Many other young military officers and civilians admired Awolowo back then as the face of the radical movement in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

On the surface, the coup looks like an Igbo plot: almost all its leading plotters were Igbo or Igbo-speaking, almost all its victims were non-Igbo, and Ironsi, who crushed it and became head of state, was Igbo.

But let the fact speak for itself.

Non-Igbo officers took part.
The stated aim of bringing Awo, who was no political friend of the Igbo, to power, does not sit with the Igbo angle.
Northerners were actively involved in executing the coup and even had sympathy for the coup, particularly from the minority groups of the North. Late Colonel Yohana Madaki said in 1986 in an interview with the African Concord magazine that he would have gladly participated in the coup if Nzeogwu had approached him.
Contrary to the argument that Unegbe was shot for refusing to surrender keys to the armoury (which were not with him since he was the army’s quartermaster general), Ademoyega wrote on pages 60 and 61 of his book that Unegbe was earmarked for arrest from day one by the plotters. So his death was not a mistake, in a manner of speaking.

I wish the coup never took place. Being idealistic young men, the plotters had no real understanding of the nature of Nigerian society or the power of ethnic loyalties. The killings were also downright brutal, no matter the justifications. For instance, the children of the Ademuleguns saw their parents gunned down by officers who were close family friends. The coup bred instinctive ethnic hatred and distrust. True, the government of the day messed up the country, and perhaps the plotters felt they had to use the gun to foster change, but they unleashed even greater problems than the ones they set out to solve, namely the counter coup of 29 July 1966 and the civil war.